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THE ECONOMICS AND PERPLEXING UTAH LAW 
OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 
Mark A. Glick, James R. Kearl, & Cory D. Sinclair* 
 
Injured parties have sought monetary damages for a very long time. In some 
cases, these damages are immediate and one-time; for example, an automobile 
wreck that totals a car but results in no other harm, or the failure to deliver a 
consumable to a firm on a particular date with the corresponding loss in profits on 
that date. In other cases, the damages are prospective and, often, ongoing; for 
example, an automobile wreck that interferes with the injured party’s ability to 
work for a period of time after the wreck or the failure to deliver a machine that 
reduces a firm’s future profits. Though in either of these settings there is virtually 
always a delay between when an injury occurs and when a final judgment is 
entered, surprisingly, courts continue to struggle with how to deal with the lapse of 
time between injury and final judgment when awarding damages. 
Delay between the date when an injury either occurs or begins and the date of 
final judgment creates a history in the sense that events occur between the two 
dates that may affect the parties. One element of this history is straightforward: 
Compensation occurs after injury. As a consequence, a critical issue in litigation is 
whether, in making the injured party whole, there should be compensation for this 
delay, specifically, whether prejudgment interest should be awarded. Presumably, 
the purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate for the declining value over 
time of the amount owed (the damage award).1 Despite this straightforward 
purpose, the law of prejudgment interest in Utah is anything but straightforward. 
The following simple example illustrates but one problem with Utah law: A 
creditor loans $100, with the loan to be paid back in one year. If the debtor does 
not repay the loan, the creditor will lose the opportunity to earn interest on that 
$100 during the period of time when the borrower is delinquent. In addition, the 
creditor will also lose the opportunity to earn interest on the $100 while the dispute 
over repayment is adjudicated. Given that one of the primary goals of damages in 
contracts is to place injured parties in the same position they would have been in 
                                                 
* © 2012 Mark A. Glick, James R. Kearl, & Cory D. Sinclair. Mark A. Glick is a 
Professor of Economics at the University of Utah and adjunct professor of law at the 
University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. He is also Of Counsel with Parsons 
Behle & Latimer in Salt Lake City, Utah. James R. Kearl is the A.O. Smoot Professor of 
Economics at Brigham Young University where he teaches Law & Economics and other 
applied economics courses. He is also a Senior Consultant with Charles River Associates. 
Cory Sinclair is an economist and attorney at Parsons Behle & Latimer in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. He is also an adjunct faculty member with the Economics Department at the 
University of Utah where he teaches Law & Economics. The authors would also like to 
thank Jonathan H. Love for his significant contribution to this Article. 
1 Encon Utah, L.L.C. v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, L.L.C., 210 P.3d 263, 275 (Utah 2009). 
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had the breach not occurred,2 courts will generally award interest on the $100 from 
the time of the breach to the date of judgment. Including pre-judgment interest in 
damages in this simple example is straightforward and not controversial under 
Utah law. However, changing the cause of action results in the injured party not 
being eligible for prejudgment interest. For example, if the damages were caused 
by a tort such as defamation, and the injured party spent $100 salvaging his 
reputation after the defamatory act, prejudgment interest would not be awarded.3 
The different outcomes in these two scenarios are not specific to the examples: In 
Utah, the prejudgment interest for which an injured party is eligible depends upon 
the type of claim or injury, even if the same amount is lost.4 It is these types of 
inconsistencies, which run afoul of basic economic principles, that are the subject 
of this Article. 
The law has long recognized that some grasp of economic principles is 
required to properly fashion damage rules that accurately compensate injured 
plaintiffs.5 Economists are typically qualified to provide judges and juries with 
expert testimony on this topic, and economic analysis, often filtered through law 
review commentaries, has long guided the jurisprudence in this area.6 Moreover, 
the conceptual issues that arise in damage analysis have many parallels with 
problems with which economists have grappled for a long time. The issue of delay 
between an event and a later payment is precisely one of these long-studied 
economic issues. Accordingly, our analysis of how Utah law deals with delay is 
informed by substantive economic understanding and methodologies.7  
In Part I, we discuss the role of time in the calculation of damages and set 
forth three simple economic principles that inform our subsequent analysis of Utah 
law. Part II describes the determination and application of prejudgment interest 
that would be consistent with these economic principles. Part III outlines how Utah 
courts award prejudgment interest. We show that Utah’s approach violates basic 
economic principles and undermines the well-defined purposes for awarding 
prejudgment interest. A short conclusion follows as Part IV. 
                                                 
2 Michael S. Knoll & Jeffrey M. Colon, Prejudgment Interest, in LITIGATION 
SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 9.1, 9.2 (Roman L. Weil et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
3 Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907) (stating that prejudgment 
interest is not allowed in cases of libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, 
assault and battery, and others). 
4 Compare UTAH CODE. ANN. § 15-1-1 (West 2009) (setting prejudgment interest for 
contract damages at 10%), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-824 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) 
(setting prejudgment interest rate for personal injury damages at 7.5%). 
5 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 253 (6th ed. 2012). 
6 Peter B. Frank et al., The Role of the Financial Expert in Litigation Services, in 
LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 1.4. 
7 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 5, at 1 (“Economics is the most advanced of the social 
sciences, and the legal system contains many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that 
economists have studied successfully.” (citation omitted)). 
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I.  TIME AND THE CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
 
Justice is always delayed in the sense that damages are never awarded 
immediately after one party engages in, or fails to take, an action that creates 
liability. Adjudication takes time. There is always a gap between the date of injury 
(“T0”) and the date of final judgment (“Tj”).8 The matter is typically more 
complicated, however, because while damages may begin at T0, they may also 
continue into the future, even after Tj. It is well settled that damages are a sum-
certain at the date when there is a final judgment on the matter.9 It follows that 
because of delay, a sum-certain damages award has three components: (1) the 
compensable harm at the time the wrongful action occurred (“immediate harm”); 
(2) the compensable harm that occurred after the wrongful action, but before final 
judgment (“once prospective, but now historical harm”); and (3) the compensable 
harm that occurs after the wrongful action, but which remains prospective at the 
date of final judgment (“yet-to-be-realized harm”). 
In determining sum-certain compensation when a final judgment is entered, 
time plays an important role. It does so for two reasons: First, the delay between 
when liability was triggered and final judgment is entered leaves the plaintiff 
uncompensated for a period of time. Second, in those cases when there is harm 
extending beyond the date of final judgment, the plaintiff is compensated at the 
time of final judgment for yet-to-be-realized harm that will only occur over time in 
the future. In this Article, we explore the Utah law that addresses the first of these 
reasons, the remedy for delay between liability and judgment that is generally 
termed “prejudgment interest.” However, for reasons that will become clear, any 
exploration of prejudgment interest requires some consideration of the second 
reason. Specifically, how courts deal with the remaining prospective harm after a 
                                                 
8 For expositional convenience, we use the following notations: 
Variable Meaning 
R Discount rate 
r Prejudgment interest rate 
T0 Date of wrongful action 
Tj Date of final judgment 
Dj Damages 
H0 Immediate damages at time of wrongful action 
Hi 
Harm at a given time, Ti, caused by wrongful action 
where Ti denotes a given date sometime after the date of 
the wrongful action. Ti could denote a date between the 
T0 and Tj or it could denote a date after Tj. 
 
9 See, e.g., Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
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sum-certain final judgment is entered can affect, explicitly or implicitly, the 
amount of prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff. We also show that the 
way once prospective but now historical harm is treated under the law can affect 
the dollar amount of prejudgment interest awarded.10 
 
A.  Applicable Economic Principles 
 
It is settled legal doctrine that the goal of awarding damages is to place an 
injured party in the monetary situation he would have been in had the wrongful act 
not occurred—“to make the plaintiff whole.”11 This objective compels damage 
experts to construct a “but for” scenario; that is, a hypothetical situation the 
plaintiff would be in had the wrongful act not happened. Damages can then be 
calculated as the monetary value that the plaintiff would have achieved in a but-for 
world less the actual money received in the actual world where the wrongful act 
occurred.12 This difference is precisely what the plaintiff lost due to the wrongful 
act. To be admissible, the construction of a but-for world must use information and 
rely on assumptions that are “reasonably certain.”13 Moreover, the calculation of 
damages must be in accord with accepted economic theory and principles and be 
consistent with the facts of the case.14 An admissible adjustment of damages for 
time has to meet these conditions. In particular, damages that occur at different 
moments in time cannot be summed.15 Prejudgment interest should also meet these 
conditions and, in addition, meet the goal of making the plaintiff whole with 
respect to the impact of delay.16 
Three simple, but powerful, economic principles apply to damages: First, a 
“dollar is a dollar”—the source of a dollar payment should not matter to a 
recipient. Second, a “dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.”17 
                                                 
10 By this we mean future harm that is discounted back to some historical date prior to 
Tj. 
11 Konrad Bonsack, Damages Assessment, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook, and the Pie-
Powder Court, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1990). 
12 Robert Hall & Victoria Lazear, Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses 
in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 277, 281 fig.1 
(Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000). 
13 See Restatement of Contracts, Second, Section 352.  See also UTAH R. EVID. 702; 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 395–400 (Utah 1989). 
14 UTAH R. EVID. 702; Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 765–66 
(Utah 2010); Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 395–400. 
15 Adding dollars realized at different dates in time is akin to the old saw about adding 
apples and oranges. The present value (where “present” is a specific date) of dollars 
realized at different dates can, however, be added. See, e.g., JAMES R. KEARL, ECONOMICS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 413–38 (6th ed. 2011). 
16 See Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.2. 
17 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 12 (5th ed. 1996); see also RICHARD A. DEFUSCO ET AL., QUANTITATIVE 
METHODS FOR INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 2 (2001); SHANNON P. PRATT, COST OF CAPITAL: 
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Conversely, dollars lost in the past are worth more than current dollars.18 Third, a 
“risky dollar is worth less than a for-certain dollar” or, more generally, higher risk 
dollars are “worth” less than lower risk dollars.19 
There are four drivers of these three principles: The first is the perfect 
fungibility of money. Since the use of one dollar cannot be distinguished from 
another dollar, the value of a dollar to an individual comes from what it can be 
used for, not its source. The second driver is the time value of money. Individuals 
inherently prefer to buy things “today” (i.e., in the present) rather than to save and 
buy things at a later date, and so must be compensated to reduce current spending 
and save for the future.20A third driver is the possibility of inflation. If there is 
inflation, individuals have to be compensated for the expected decline in the 
purchasing power of a dollar should they choose to save or otherwise defer 
consumption.21 In markets, the sum of the compensation for waiting and for 
inflation corresponds to the “risk-free nominal interest rate” or, more descriptively, 
the “rate of return on risk-free assets in a world where inflation is anticipated.”22 
The fourth driver is that individuals are generally averse to risk. Individuals who 
are risk averse have to be compensated for bearing risk if future payments or 
deferred consumption are uncertain.23 In markets, the sum of the compensation for 
waiting, inflation, and risk corresponds to the “rate of return on assets with 
particular, specific, risks.” If essentially risk-free assets are available (for example, 
short-term Treasury bills), then individuals will only hold risky assets if the 
expected returns on those assets are greater than those on risk-free assets.24 
                                                 
ESTIMATION AND APPLICATIONS 5–6 (1998) (stating that future dollars must be discounted 
to represent their future value). 
18 See Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.2 (stating interest must be added to past 
dollars to represent their future value). 
19 See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 133 (4th ed. 1999); BREALEY & MYERS, supra 
note 17, at 13 (“[A] safe dollar is worth more than a risky one.”). 
20 See DEFUSCO ET AL., supra note 17, at 2. In markets, the necessary compensation 
for waiting corresponds to the “real interest rate” or what might be termed the “rate of 
return on risk-free assets in a world without inflation.” See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 
128, 133. 
21 See Gaurav Jetley et al., Estimating the Cost of Capital, in LITIGATION SERVICES 
HANDBOOK, supra note 2; PRATT, supra note 17, at 5. 
22 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 128, 133, 138–40; DEFUSCO ET AL., supra note 
17, at 2. Widely held views about the rate of inflation—“expected inflation”—will be built 
into the nominal interest rate: for example, if the risk-free real rate of interest is 4% and the 
expected rate of inflation is 3%, then the risk-free nominal rate of interest will be 7%. Id. at 
128, 138–40. 
23 See R.F. Lanzillotti & A.K. Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial 
Litigation: Present Value of Lost Opportunities, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 125, 130 
(1990) (“Since damages for future lost profits should not include the amount of the risk 
premium, the plaintiff’s award should be calculated using the cost of capital adjusted to the 
risk of the project.”). 
24 BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 133. 
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Likewise, individuals will only hold assets whose returns are subject to greater risk 
if the expected returns are greater than those on assets whose returns are subject to 
lower risk.25 Below we use these fundamental economic principles to address the 
issue of prejudgment interest. 
 
B.  The Effects of Time on Prejudgment Interest 
 
There are a number of ways in which time affects prejudgment interest. These 
issues can be framed by considering a few simple diagrams. For purposes of 
discussion, we let R be the interest rate used to discount prospective harm that 
occurs after the date of defendant’s action that created liability (T0). 26 Hence, if 
damages were awarded immediately following the defendant’s wrongful action, 
then they would have two elements: immediate harm (H0) and prospective harm 
(H1, H2, etc.) discounted to T0 at rate R. Since adjudication takes time, however, 
final judgment will be entered Tj and not T0, per the following diagram. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At Tj, courts must now address three damage components: H0, immediate harm for 
which there has not yet been compensation; harm that was prospective at T0 but is 
historical at Tj (i.e., the harm realized between T0 and Tj); and harm that was 
prospective at T0 which remains prospective at Tj (i.e., at periods after Tj). Clearly, 
if prejudgment interest (for purposes of discussion denoted as “r”) is to be applied, 
it should be applied to H0. It is much less clear, however, how prejudgment interest 
should be applied to “historical harm” (before Tj, e.g., H1 and H2). Moreover, how 
                                                 
25 Id. at 155, 187. 
26 Hereafter, Hi denotes the harm at time Ti, where i indexes future dates or periods. 
“historical harm” “remaining prospective harm” 
(before time Tj)  (after time Tj) 
im
m
ediate harm
 
time    T0                  T1     T2 Tj      T3            T4 T5     T6 
harm   H0 H1     H2         H3                 H4 H5     H6 
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Alternative 2 
using r  
using r  
  using r 
time   T0     T1    T2 Tj    T3          T4             T5               T6 
harm  H0 H1    H2       H3               H4            H5 H6 
Alternative 1 
using R 
using R 
using r 
the “remaining prospective harm” (after Tj, e.g., H3, H4, H5, and H6) is handled also 
can affect, at least implicitly, the prejudgment interest that is awarded. That is, 
aside from the issue of compensating the plaintiff for the delay associated with a 
payment for the immediate harm, delay turns what would have been prospective 
into history—the unrealized becomes realized—and, it would appear, delay 
shortens the period over which the remaining prospective damages occur. As more 
time passes between the dates of injury and final judgment, the relative size (or 
duration) of the three categories of harm changes.27 
There are two methods to address “historical harm” that “normalizes” harm 
values that occur at different times (or periods): Discount H1 and H2 to T0 using R 
(the discount rate) and then bring the sum of H0 plus the now discounted H1 and H2 
forward to Tj using r (the prejudgment interest rate). Alternatively, separately bring 
H0, H1, and H2 forward to Tj using r.28 These possibilities are illustrated in the next 
diagram: 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 This change in size creates an incentive, in certain cases, to game the system by 
attempting to move the trial date to maximize damages depending on when the majority of 
damages are suffered. We briefly discuss these incentives in Part IV. 
28 Since damages that occur at different moments in time cannot be summed, there are 
two ways that sum-certain damages can be derived: damages at different points in time can 
brought back to an earlier date and by reducing their value (“discounting”) and then 
summing the discounted figures; or damages at different points in time can be brought 
forward to later date by increasing their value (“bringing forward” or “compounding”) and 
then summing the compounded figures. 
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As a practical matter, Alternative 2 can yield substantially larger sum-certain 
damages at Tj than Alternative 1 depending on the size of the difference between R 
and r. For example, if the plaintiff’s losses are $1 million immediately and $1 
million in each of the following years, if final judgment occurs three years after the 
harm occurred, and if R = .2 and r = .03,29 then Alternative 1 yields damages of 
$2,713,675 while Alternative 2 yields damages of $3,183,600—nearly 18% higher, 
even though nominal damages are “equal”.  At a more abstract level, Alternatives 
1 and 2 embed very different assumptions about risk and uncertainty. 
There are also two possible methods to calculate the “remaining prospective 
damages”: Discount H3, H4 . . . to T0 using R (a discount rate) and then bring the 
sum of the discounted values, plus H0, forward to Tj using r (the prejudgment 
interest rate); or, discount H3, H4 . . . to Tj (the date of final judgment) using R and 
add to this component of damages the value at Tj determined by either Alternative 
1 or Alternative 2 in Figure 1 for H0, H1 and H2. These possibilities are illustrated 
below.30  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The values of R and r are assumed for this hypothetical.   
30 To keep the diagram relatively uncluttered, we’ve illustrated only discounting some 
“remaining prospective harm.” In actually determining damages at Tj, all “remaining 
prospective harm”—which might extend into the indefinite future—would have to be 
discounted to T0 (Alternative 3) or Tj (Alternative 4). 
Alternative 3 
using R 
using R 
 
using r 
using R 
time  T0               T1    T2 Tj    T3           T4 T5   T6 
harm H0             H1   H2        H3                H4 H5   H6 
Alternative 4 
using r 
 
using R 
using R 
using R 
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We summarize these alternatives as follows: 
 
Treatment of Historical Damages 
Alternative 1 
Discount historical damages to the date of the wrongful 
action using the discount rate, R. Then bring that sum 
forward using the prejudgment interest rate, r. 
Alternative 2 Bring historical damages forward to the date of final judgment separately using the prejudgment interest rate, r. 
Treatment of Prospective Damages 
Alternative 3 
Discount prospective damages to the date of the wrongful 
action using the discount rate, R. Then bring that sum plus 
initial damages forward using the prejudgment interest 
rate, r.  
Alternative 4 
Discount prospective damages to the date of the final 
judgment using the discount rate, R. Then add this total to 
the historical damages calculated using either Alternative 
1 or Alternative 2. 
 
Again, as a practical matter, Alternative 4 will generally yield substantially 
higher damages than will Alternative 3. For example, if R = .2, then $1 million in 
prospective damages five years from Tj would be a sum-certain of $401,881 at Tj. 
By contrast, if Tj is four years after T0 and the same $1 million in prospective 
damages is discounted to T0 rather than Tj and then brought forward to the time of 
final judgment, Tj, at r = .03, the contribution to sum-certain damages at would be 
$218,230. For these values of R and r, the approach illustrated as Alternative 4 
yields damages at Tj that are nearly twice the size of damages that would be 
awarded if the approach in Alternative 3 is adopted. 
This difference in awarded damages is essentially arbitrary with regard to the 
actual harm caused by a wrongful action. Both immediate and prospective 
damages are determined by the actions of the defendant that triggered liability (in 
this example, a $1 million loss nine years from the date of injury). The damages 
came into being when the defendant undertook, or failed to undertake, some action 
on a specific date. By contrast, the date of final judgment is arbitrary.31 This means 
that the distinction between losses that are “historical” and “prospective at the time 
of final judgment” is also arbitrary in that it is an artifact of delay—delay shifts 
losses from “prospective” to “historical.” As a result, any distinction between the 
two with regard to prejudgment interest is also arbitrary. It also means that the date 
of final judgment, which is essentially arbitrary with regard to the date of injury 
                                                 
31 To the degree that either plaintiff or defendant has an incentive to delay, the date of 
final judgment may not be completely arbitrary. See infra Part IV. 
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and the date when, in the future, harm will occur, can dramatically affect the 
damages that are awarded. 
 
C.  Historical and Prospective Damages 
 
While the focus of this Article is on prejudgment interest, it should be clear 
that the prejudgment interest award in Alternatives 1 and 3 depends on how courts 
deal with historical and prospective damages. Though it is less clear, this is also 
the case with Alternative 4 because of the rate of R. Hence, in this section we 
briefly discuss the discount rate, R. 
There is very little, if any, legal guidance in Utah or elsewhere with regard to 
dealing with prospective damages beyond general findings that they cannot be “too 
speculative.”32 Indeed, even the question of whether the discount rate (R) should 
reflect uncertainties about prospective, yet-to-be realized damages is largely 
unresolved.33 Because individuals are risk averse,34 however, risky dollars are 
worth less than for-certain dollars.35 This is reflected in markets where to 
compensate for risk, higher-risk activities have higher expected returns.36 A sum-
certain judgment is, however, just that: a specific amount of money awarded on a 
specific date. Hence, to make a plaintiff whole, risky dollars have to be converted 
to “certainty-equivalent” or “risk-free” dollars.37 While this is a general principle 
equally applicable to damages for personal injury and business losses, we explore 
the reasons why sum-certain judgments should account for risk in a business 
setting. 
A person developing a project typically must make investment expenditures 
or outlays before any profits can be realized. That is, the timing of virtually any 
business opportunity requires for-certain expenditures “now” with only uncertain 
returns in “the future.” For example, suppose a building costs $1 million and, once 
                                                 
32 This standard is developed in somewhat more detail below. See infra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
33 We are not implying that courts or legislatures ought to set a specific risk-adjusted 
discount rate, but, for reasons detailed immediately below, it seems odd that courts have 
not settled the question about whether the parties have to deal in an explicit way with the 
inherent uncertainty associated with prospective damages. 
34 See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND 
EXTENSIONS 538–42 (9th ed. 2005). 
35 PRATT, supra note 17, at 37 (“As the market’s perception of the degree of risk of an 
investment goes up, the rate of return that the market requires (the discount rate) goes 
up.”). Economists measure risk aversion by the curvature of the utility function with 
respect to wealth. 
36 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 137 (“Riskier assets have provided higher 
expected returns . . . .”). 
37 See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130 (“Since damages for future lost 
profits should not include the amount of the risk premium, the plaintiff’s award should be 
calculated using the cost of capital adjusted to the risk of the project.”). 
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finished, the developer expects (but does not know for certain) that she can sell it 
for $1.5 million, generating nominal profits of $500,000. Because she has to 
construct the building before it can generate profits, the expenditure is for certain, 
but the revenue from selling it and, hence, the profits are uncertain: by the time the 
building is finished, real estate prices may have declined or not increased as much 
as expected.38 As a consequence of such uncertainty, the $1 million expenditure in 
hopes of earning $500,000 in profits is a risky bet. Since people are risk averse, a 
rational investor would account for these risks in making a decision about whether 
to spend the $1 million to build the building. If the risks associated with the 
expected, but uncertain, profits increased, a person willing to spend $1 million 
when the risk was less would be less willing to spend the $1 million when the risk 
was greater. More generally, the greater the risks, the less a person will value the 
possibility of getting $500,000 at some point in the future. For these reasons, a 
person will discount (in the common-sense meaning of the word) the possible 
$500,000 profit for the risks that, having spent $1 million, the building may not 
actually sell for $1.5 million.39 
It is well established in economics and finance that the way to handle this 
kind of response to risk is to discount (in a formal, technical way) the expected, but 
uncertain, future profits using a discount rate that accounts for a reasonable 
estimate of the risks associated with the “$1 million now; perhaps $1.5 million in 
the future” bet.40 While courts have been slow to come to this view, accounting for 
risk through discounting is the accepted methodology in financial economics.41 
The authors of a well-known and well-regarded text write: 
 
Long before the development of modern theories linking risk and 
expected return, smart financial managers adjusted for risk in capital 
                                                 
38 There will also be risks associated with the expected cost to build the structure. For 
example, it may be that the costs of building increase over the course of the construction 
project so that it actually costs $2 million to complete the building, but expectations with 
regard to the selling price of the building ($1.5 million) are unchanged. Or it may be that it 
takes longer than anticipated to complete the building and, hence, the expected profits are 
delayed, etc. These possibilities—that costs change and that there are delays—also make 
the future expected profits risky because, again, the changed costs to complete the building 
must be incurred before the expected profits can be realized. 
39 While, per the examples above and in the body of the text, the actual profits may be 
below what they were expected to be, it may also be that they are greater than the expected 
outcome of $500,000 because of, for example, an unanticipated price increase. 
40 See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130. The discount rate would also 
have to account for the time value of money and expected inflation. David E. Ault & 
Gilbert L. Rutman, The Calculation of Damage Awards: The Issue of “Prejudgment 
Interest,” 12(2) J. FORENSIC ECON. 97, 103 (1999); Jetley et al., supra note 21, at 7.1–7.3; 
PRATT, supra note 17, at 37. 
41 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 537–540 nn. 20–24 
(1983) (addressing evolution of how courts have treated inflation, risk, and time in damage 
calculations). 
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budgeting. They realized intuitively that, other things being equal, risky 
projects are less desirable than safe ones. Therefore financial managers 
demanded a higher rate of return from risky projects . . .Various rules of 
thumb are often used to make these risk adjustments. For example, many 
companies estimate the rate of return required by investors in their 
securities and use the company cost of capital to discount the cash flows 
. . . [I]nvestors require a higher rate of return from a very risky company, 
such a firm will have a higher company cost of capital and will set a 
higher discount rate for its new investment opportunities. . . . Each 
project should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital. . . . 
That is, the firm should discount the cash flows . . . at the expected rate 
that investors would demand to make a separate investment (in the 
project). The true cost of capital depends upon the use to which the 
capital is put.42 
 
And in one of the most widely cited handbooks used by valuation practitioners, the 
author writes: 
 
The cost of capital for a project is typically estimated by studying capital 
costs (including debt and equity) for existing projects deemed to be 
comparable in risk. It is related to the risk of the project, not to the risk or 
credit-worthiness of the firm that is contemplating undertaking the 
project. Thus, if different firms have the same expectations about the 
cash flows and risks of a project, they will each perceive the project as 
having the same NPV. This illustrates . . . that cost of capital is specific 
to the investment, not the investor.43 
 
The importance of accounting for risk in determining sum-certain damages 
can be illustrated in a slightly different way. Suppose that an investor believes that 
the expected profits of a project will be $500,000. What would she be willing to 
pay up front for this kind of opportunity? There is no answer to this question 
without discounting the expected profits for the possibility (“risks” or 
“uncertainties”) that the project, once completed, won’t actually generate $500,000 
in profits. For example, if for a given level of uncertainty about whether the 
$500,000 will really materialize, it makes sense to spend $1 million, but it cannot 
make sense to spend $1 million if the uncertainty about the future payoff of 
$500,000 increases. To clarify that the $500,000 expected payoff, by itself, doesn’t 
                                                 
42 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, 204–05 (emphasis in original). 
43 IBBOTSON ASSOCS., IBBOTSON SBBI 2009 VALUATION YEARBOOK 28 (2009); see 
also KRISHNA G. PALEPU & PAUL M. HEALY, BUSINESS ANALYSIS & VALUATION: USING 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8-1 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the role of government with regard 
to acquisition outcomes); PRATT, supra note 17, at 10 (“[T]he cost of capital is customarily 
used as a discount rate in order to convert expected future returns to a present value.”). 
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provide sufficient information to determine a sum-certain at Tj, consider three 
alternatives, each of which has an expected payoff of $500,000: 
 
A: payoff in 1 year of $0 with probability = .5  
or $1,000,000 with probability = .5 
 
B: payoff in 1 year of –$500,000 with probability = .5  
or $1,500,000 with probability = .5 
 
C: payoff in 1 year of –$1,500,000 with probability = .66  
or $4,500,000 with probability = .33 
 
A risk-averse individual would value the expected payoff of $500,000 in each of 
these alternatives quite differently. Specifically, such an individual would be 
willing to pay more for opportunity A than for opportunity C. The reason is that 
the spread between the two possible outcomes in each opportunity increases from 
A to B to C and, hence, so does the risk involved: opportunity C is more risky than 
opportunity B which is more risky than opportunity A, even though they each have 
the same expected payoff. For a risk-averse individual, opportunities with less risk 
are “worth” more, all else being equal. 
While there may be different views about the degree of risk (and 
corresponding risk premium) between the parties and, hence, a jury issue with 
regard to the size of a specific risk-adjusted discount rate to be applied in a 
particular case, it is puzzling that the courts have chosen not to narrow the issue of 
discounting to the size of the risk premium. Instead, it would appear that juries and 
judges are often left to determine whether there should even be a risk premium.44 
As a general matter, R will be “large” relative to r, even when r is set by 
statute. This is because R includes the risk that the future event will not occur.45 
The numbers in the examples illustrating the differences between Alternatives 1 
through 4 are not out of line with what reasonable estimates of R and r might be in 
a particular case (20% and 3%, respectively). Even in those jurisdictions where r is 
set by statute, it is generally below 10%.46 Hence, in the determination of awarded 
                                                 
44 Note that the effect of risk can be handled by reducing the prospective loss. In 
personal injury matters, for example, projected incomes are sometimes reduced by the 
probability of death before retirement and the probability of retirement at a particular age. 
As such, the risk premium in the discount rate would be less since the prospective income 
stream itself has been reduced (“discounted”). 
45 See Lanzillotti & Esquibel, supra note 23, at 130. 
46 See Prejudgment Interest & Interest on Judgments Generally, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_PreCivPJIPub.pdf (last 
modified Aug. 21, 2011) (state by state comparison); see also John R. Philips & Neill W. 
Freeman, Interest as Damages, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE 
OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 9.1–9.20 (Roman Weil et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing how interest is awarded under federal and state law). 
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prejudgment interest, whether prospective damages are discounted by R to the time 
of judgment or to the time when the injury occurred will almost always 
substantially affect the size of the sum-certain award. Likewise, whether historical 
damages are discounted at all or just brought forward to the date of final judgment 
at the prejudgment interest rate will almost always significantly affect the size of 
the sum-certain award. 
R, however, also affects awarded prejudgment interest in a more subtle, and 
legally troubling, way. If harm that remains prospective at Tj is discounted at R to 
Tj rather than to T0, the plaintiff is being implicitly awarded “prejudgment” interest 
on prospective damages equal to R, not r. This is easily seen by noting that if 
prospective damages are, for example, $1 million occurring five years following 
the date of final judgment and discounted at 20% to the date of final judgment, the 
damage award is approximately $401,881. If there is an additional year of delay, 
however, the same $1 million, now four years from the date of final judgment, has 
a discounted value of about $482,253—20% greater than $401,881. So a delay of 
one year has, essentially, awarded the plaintiff a prejudgment interest rate of 20%. 
The law is also silent on the treatment of what we have termed “once 
prospective, now historical” losses. Specifically, should “historical” harm be 
discounted to the date of injury and then brought forward to the date of judgment 
at the prejudgment interest applied to immediate harms, or should “historical” 
harm be simply brought forward to the date of judgment at the prejudgment 
interest rate? These alternatives (Alternatives 1 and 2 in Figure 2, above) reflect 
quite different views about the meaning of the risk associated with prospective (not 
historical) losses. We have appealed to a common-sense understanding that “the 
future is uncertain” and, therefore, that prospective losses are risky, not-for-certain 
dollars which must be discounted using a risk-adjusted interest rate if a sum-certain 
award is to compensate, but not overcompensate, the plaintiff. What is really 
meant by “uncertainty” is a challenging problem and not one that we can fully sort 
out here. What is clear is that uncertainty and therefore risk must be consistently 
accounted for when dealing with the possibilities of compensating the plaintiff for 
the effects of delay.47 
                                                 
47 One view is that prospective damages are uncertain because the future is certain but 
“unknowable with certainty.” In this view, there is a “true value” for some future event 
(i.e., a prospective loss component of a damages award), but it is enveloped in a cloud. 
History then becomes the process by which the cloud dissipates and the “true value” is 
revealed. Choosing Alternative 2 is consistent with this view of risk. That is, the true values 
“revealed” by delay should simply be brought forward to the date of final judgment at the 
prejudgment interest rate. By the time that they are known, they aren’t different in kind 
from the immediate harm to which prejudgment interest applies. A second view is that 
prospective damages are uncertain because they are stochastic (essentially random). In this 
view there is no “true value.” Rather, future events are random, although some outcomes 
may be more likely than others. History, in this case, is a particular draw from the random 
distribution—there could have been other draws. Hence, history doesn’t reveal the “true 
value”—there isn’t one—but one of several possible values. Since there was risk associated 
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D.  Consistency Across Causes of Action 
 
Earlier we noted that one dollar today is worth more than one dollar in the 
future, and for-certain dollars are worth more than risky dollars.48 Therefore, if, in 
the but-for world created to determine settlement, the plaintiff lost risky future 
dollars, it would be inconsistent to award him or her an equivalent dollar amount 
of for-certain present dollars. Instead, damages should reflect the risk that plaintiff 
would have faced.49 In addition, consistency also implies that a sum-certain 
damages award should reflect the time value of money, regardless of the cause of 
action. Specifically, unless there are compelling reasons—and we see none—why 
a dollar of harm under one cause of action should not be equal to a dollar of harm 
under a different cause of action, the legal principles adopted to make adjustments 
for time should be applicable across all types of claims. Once a damage calculation 
reaches the threshold for admissibility, for example, it seems odd that there should 
be different prejudgment interest rules for damages in torts, contracts, defamation, 
property and other claims. Once the calculation of the monetary situation of the 
plaintiff absent the wrong act has been accomplished, all legal claims are 
homogeneous from an economic point of view—a dollar is a dollar regardless of 
legal context. Whether a plaintiff loses $100,000, including prejudgment interest to 
compensate for delay because of a tort, a breach of contract or a violation of a 
property right is of no consequence for the calculation damages. To make the 
plaintiff whole requires an award of $100,000, regardless of the claim.50 
In particular, if prejudgment interest is awarded in order to place the plaintiff 
in the position he/she would have been in absent the wrongful act, the plaintiff 
must be compensated for being deprived of the award between T0 and Tj. It is 
unlikely that delay occurs because of the cause of action. This suggests that 
prejudgment interest should be awarded on an equal basis for all compensatory 
dollar awards where a harm has occurred.   
 
                                                 
with the outcome and since not discounting risky outcomes to T0 implicitly awards 
prejudgment interest at R, then employing Alternative 2 does likewise. It is equivalent to 
awarding the plaintiff, who was harmed both immediately and prospectively at T0, 
compensation for risk that because of the action that the defendant took at T0, she did not 
have to bear. Hence, choosing Alternative 1 is consistent with this view of uncertainty and 
risk and how the plaintiff should be compensated for prejudgment losses. 
48 See supra notes 18–19, 35 and accompanying text. 
49 See PRATT, supra note 17, at 5; Jetley et al., supra note 21, at 7.2. 
50 Admittedly, the risk or certainty of prevailing in a contract action may be different 
than a tort action, but this fact alone has no impact on the proper prejudgment interest rate 
that should be awarded once the damage award has been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence to the trier of fact. 
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E.  Brief Summary 
 
Prejudgment interest is important because there is a delay between the date 
when an action creating harm occurs and the date when there is a final judgment 
awarding compensation to the injured party.  Full compensation requires payment 
for the harm of the wrongful act as well as the delay.  There are two components of 
a dollar payment that compensates for the delay:  a prejudgment interest rate and 
an amount of money to which that interest rate is applied.  As must be clear from 
the discussion to this point, the determination of the amount of money to which a 
prejudgment interest rate applies isn’t necessarily straightforward and depends 
upon how the harm that occurs after the action that creates legal liability is treated.  
The matter is made more complex in those cases where there is harm to the injured 
party after the date of the action that creates legal liability, but before the date of 
final judgment, and even more complex where there is likely to be harm to the 
injured party after the date of final judgment that awards sum-certain damages.  
We have shown that the various ways of treating what we termed “historical” and 
“prospective” harms can yield quite different dollar amounts to which a 
prejudgment interest rate might be applied.   
Having explored the various ways for determining an amount of money to 
which a prejudgment interest rate might be applied, we next turn to the issue of the 
economically appropriate prejudgment interest rate. 
 
II.  ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 
What should the prejudgment interest rate be? The answer requires a 
determination of the amount of money the plaintiff lost because she was deprived 
of a monetary award between T0 and Tj. If the plaintiff were awarded money at T0, 
and the plaintiff were rational, she would have invested the money (rather than 
stuffing it in a mattress). That investment would have yielded a return in the time 
between T0 and Tj. However, the plaintiff was denied this return by being forced to 
wait until Tj to receive the award. The prejudgment interest rate should compensate 
the plaintiff for this loss, but should not be overcompensated simply for delaying.51 
The rate of return that the plaintiff would receive from an investment depends 
on at least three factors: (1) the prevailing interest rate, (2) compounding, and (3) 
the riskiness of the opportunity the defendant’s wrongful action denied the 
plaintiff.52 The interest rate in the United States has varied substantially over time. 
In the last decade, for example, the prime rate has varied between 9.5% in 2001 
                                                 
51 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) (“[P]rejudgment 
interest should ordinarily be awarded where necessary to afford the plaintiff full 
compensation for the infringement.”). 
52 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, at 34, 41–43, 160–64; see also PRATT, supra 
note 17, at 5. 
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and 3.25% in 2011.53 It therefore makes a difference whether the date when the 
harm first occurred, T0, is in 2001 or 2011. It follows that it makes little sense to 
set a single prejudgment interest rate that is independent of the actual period of 
time when the delay occurred. Such inflexibility saves little in litigation costs 
because information regarding current interest rates is readily available, yet makes 
it essentially impossible to meet the “make the plaintiff whole” standard.54 Simply 
put: prejudgment interest should take account of the prevailing economic 
conditions during the period T0 to Tj.55 The proclivity of state legislatures to 
specify a (fixed) prejudgment interest rate makes little sense either in terms of 
judicial economy or compensation. 
In addition, if the plaintiff had invested the award on T0, she would have 
received compound interest. Specifically, in each period between T0 and Tj the 
plaintiff can be assumed to have reinvested both principal and interest and, hence, 
to have received interest on the invested interest in the next period. Moreover, as a 
practical matter, compound interest is paid on virtually every alternative available 
to a plaintiff, including bank accounts, bonds, stocks, and commercial contracts.56 
However, courts are given broad latitude to select compound or simple interest, 
with most choosing simple interest for ease of calculation.57 However, this practice 
is ill-conceived because it is not in accord with standard commercial practices.58 
Finally, under competitive conditions the rate of return on an investment is 
directly related to the risk of the investment.59 The return on the involuntary 
“investment” the plaintiff makes at time T0 solely because of adjudicatory delay, 
must be consistent with a prejudgment interest that reflects the risk that the 
plaintiff faces during the period of waiting for judgment. Put differently, the court 
cannot know what a plaintiff actually would have done if awarded money at T0 
rather than Tj. The plaintiff could have invested in Google shares and, ex post, 
have made a high rate of return, or made a low rate of return in U.S. Treasury 
                                                 
53 The prime rate is an interest rate on loans to a bank’s most creditworthy or best 
borrowers and is often used as a benchmark of borrowing costs. Bank Prime Loan 
Datasheet, Weekly (Wednesday), FEDERALRESERVE.ORG, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (go to the “Bank prime loan” line, then 
follow the “Weekly (Wednesday)” hyperlink to download the datasheet). 
54 See Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 
365–66 (1996) (stating that statutes simplify calculation at the expense of fairness and 
efficiency and that improved calculations using a risk-adjusted market rate can be made 
without great difficulty). 
55 See id. at 366 (“[T]he law should require courts to award prejudgment interest at 
the risk-adjusted market rate . . . .”). 
56 Although some commercial contracts call for simple interest, this is rare. 
57 See Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 557 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (declining to hold that courts should always use compound interest, leaving 
discretion with trial court). 
58 See Knoll, supra note 54, at 307–08. 
59 BODIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 133. 
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securities, or lost money betting on subprime mortgage securities. What we do 
know is what the plaintiff was actually forced to do: she was forced to allow the 
defendant to keep the damage award between T0 and Tj. The actual risk faced by a 
plaintiff in these circumstances is the risk that the defendant would default on a 
final judgment awarded at Tj. The rate of interest that reflects the probability of a 
default by the defendant is the defendant’s borrowing rate.60 The logic is that 
banks are in the business of assessing the risk of their borrowers defaulting on 
loans. A risky defendant borrowing money from a bank would have been charged a 
higher interest rate than a less risky defendant. Since the plaintiff has essentially 
“lent” the award to the defendant, the defendant, on this argument, should pay a 
prejudgment interest rate equal to what he must pay on a bank loan in order to 
make the plaintiff whole. A second possible answer is to assume that the court will 
ensure that the judgment will be paid, and, therefore, the plaintiff essentially faces 
no risk during the time she must wait until judgment and should receive a risk-free 
rate of interest. This approach assumes that the risks of litigation itself are not to be 
considered in determining damages.61 
Notice that in the first option the determination of the prejudgment interest 
rate, r, focuses on the position of the defendant. The second option focuses on risk-
free opportunities available to the plaintiff. By contrast, the discount rate for the 
prospective gains that the plaintiff was denied by the defendant’s wrongful actions, 
R, focuses on the risk of plaintiff’s lost future opportunities (for example, the 
expected gains from the plaintiff’s investment). Neither of the first two approaches 
will lead to a determination of r that is the same as R. The fact that r differs from 
R, however, creates the possibility that the date of trial will affect estimated 
damages—if the litigants were assigned to a judge with a full calendar rather than 
to a judge who scheduled an earlier trial, different damage awards would result, all 
else equal. This undesirable inconsistency can be avoided if all damages at all time 
periods are discounted by R to time T0 and then brought forward in their entirety 
from T0 to Tj using r (Alternative 3). Any other approach will cause damages to 
increase or decrease depending on the judge’s calendar or strategic manipulation of 
                                                 
60 In Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., Judge Posner sides with the 
those who argue that the pre-judgment interest rate should be the defendant’s borrowing 
rate: 
 
The defendant who has violated the plaintiff’s rights is in effect a debtor of the 
plaintiff until the judgment is entered and paid or otherwise collected. At any 
time before actual payment or collection of the judgment the defendant may 
default and the plaintiff come up empty-handed. The plaintiff is an unsecured, 
uninsured creditor, and the risk of default must be considered in deciding what a 
compensatory rate of interest would be. 
 
874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989). 
61 For a discussion of this point, see Knoll & Colon, supra note 2, at 9.1–9.18. 
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the litigation, a factor that should be independent of the calculations necessary to 
make the plaintiff whole. 
Put differently, since R is generally larger than r,62 if future damages are 
discounted to the date of final judgment, awarded damages will increase after 
every trial delay by more than compounding by a prejudgment interest rate. This is 
because the longer the delay, the smaller the portion of the damages that are 
discounted by R. This inconsistency (and overcompensation) has been overlooked 
by virtually every jurisdiction.63 
To summarize, basic economic principles illustrate that there are several 
methodological flaws with the current process of accounting for time and risk by 
courts. To maintain internal consistency, and to adhere to well-established and 
recognized economic principles, courts should not base the available damages on 
the cause of action alleged. Rather, awards should be based on the total damages 
suffered, regardless of legal claim. Further, prejudgment interest rates should 
account for financial market conditions, be compounded, and be equal to the 
defendant’s borrowing rate (if it is assumed that the plaintiff bears the risk that the 
defendant does not pay the judgment) or the risk-free rate (if it is assumed that 
there is no risk that the defendant will not satisfy the judgment). These straight-
forward adjustments will ensure internal consistency and will more accurately 
compensate injured parties. 
 
III.  THE PERPLEXING TREATMENT OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN UTAH LAW 
 
With this foundation, we evaluate how Utah courts account for risk and delay 
through an award of prejudgment interest. As a general matter, Utah courts run 
afoul of many of the fundamental economic precepts outlined above. 
 
A.  When Parties Are Eligible for Prejudgment Interest in Utah 
 
Not all causes of action are eligible to receive prejudgment interest awards as 
part of damages. Utah’s law on the availability of prejudgment interest originated 
with the Utah Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.64 In 
Fell, the plaintiff arranged to have several sheep transported from Wyoming to 
Illinois in the defendant’s rail car.65 During transport, the sheep were left in the rail 
car without any food or water for seventy-two hours.66 Several sheep died and the 
                                                 
62 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
63 The exception is the Eleventh Circuit, which stands alone in recognizing this 
principle. See, e.g., Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 833 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before and 
after trial so that neither party can benefit by delaying the final judgment.”). 
64 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907). 
65 Id. at 1003. 
66 Id. 
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surviving sheep lost much of their weight.67 As a result of the delivery delay, the 
plaintiff was forced to sell the surviving sheep for significantly less than he would 
have been able to sell them for had the delivery been on time and without 
incident.68 The trial court awarded damages for the sheep that died during 
transport, the loss in weight for the sheep that survived transport, and the loss 
caused by the overall delay.69 After damages for the negligent transport were 
calculated, the trial court allowed prejudgment interest on the entire damage 
amount.70 In affirming the awarding of prejudgment interest on the entire amount, 
the court examined, and rejected, the standard adopted by many other jurisdictions 
that limit prejudgment interest only to “liquidated” damage claims.71 The court 
explained that in cases of torts against property, there is no logic to support such a 
restriction: 
 
If a person’s property is destroyed or damaged, why is he not entitled to 
be compensated to the full extent of its value in money so that he may 
replace the same with other property of a like nature? If on the day of its 
injury or destruction he restores or replaces it with his own money, why 
is he not entitled to interest on that money to the date of repayment? If he 
had loaned the money to some one, he certainly would be entitled to 
interest, and, if he borrowed it from some one, he would likely have to 
pay interest for its use. . . . Is it an answer to say that the damages are 
unliquidated, and therefore interest is not to be allowed? This, to our 
minds, is no reason at all in case of injury to or destruction of property.72 
 
The court went on to lay down the oft-cited rule for a prejudgment interest award 
in Utah: 
 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed 
before judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the 
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and 
consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a 
particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing the 
amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the 
amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury . . . .73 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1004. 
70 Id. The court noted that it was unclear whether prejudgment interest was awarded 
from the date the sheep were eventually delivered to their destination or from the date the 
plaintiff made his first demand for damages. Id. 
71 Id. at 1005–07. 
72 Id. at 1005–06. 
73 Id. at 1007. 
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While Utah courts refused to limit prejudgment interest to “liquidated” 
damages—a standard that proved to be extremely difficult to apply—applying the 
standard articulated by the court in Fell is also challenging.74 Moreover, the court 
carved out several causes of action where, it argued, the resulting damages are not 
fixed with “known standards of value” and thus are not eligible for prejudgment 
interest: “In all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, 
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases where 
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to 
assess at the time of the trial,” no prejudgment interest is permissible.75 For these 
particular causes of action, the court held that prejudgment interest is not allowed 
because the resulting damages are supposedly “incomplete” and “continuing.”76 
Beyond this superficial explanation, the court offered no further justification for an 
award of prejudgment interest on some claims but not others. 
Courts interpreting the Fell standard have muddied the waters further by 
creating an even more difficult and unworkable standard. Opinions following Fell 
have required that damages be calculated with “mathematical certainty” in order to 
receive an award of prejudgment interest.77 In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc. the 
Utah Supreme Court paraphrased the Fell language quoted above, but added the 
phrase “or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy.”78 Where 
mathematical certainty is lacking, the jury must ascertain the damages, and an 
award of “prejudgment interest is not allowed.”79 
In Bjork, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of 
prejudgment interest for damages suffered by two shareholders of a corporation 
who established that the corporation breached an agreement to register and thus 
make them eligible for sale of shares of the corporation. In an earlier opinion in the 
same case, the court developed what it believed was the proper measure of 
damages for the alleged breach, which was the difference between the highest 
share value during the public offering and the value of the shares at the time of 
trial.80 The trial court followed this methodology and then added prejudgment 
interest to the damage estimate.81 To estimate these damages, it then assumed that 
there would have been a buyer for the additional shares of stock at the stock’s 
                                                 
74 See Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989); LeFavi v. 
Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 822–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
75 Fell, 88 P. at 1006. 
76 Id. As discussed in detail below, damages awarded for personal injury claims are 
now entitled to prejudgment interest by statute. See infra text accompanying notes 118–
124. 
77 See LeFavi, 994 P.2d at 823; Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 124 P.3d 269, 277 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
78 Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 316–17. 
81 Id. 
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highest price during the public offering, and that there would be a buyer willing to 
purchase the additional available shares at the current share price. In this case, the 
court argued, the share price on a particular date may be mathematically 
accurate.82 Yet the damage analysis was only certain (such that prejudgment would 
be appropriately awarded) after layers of speculative assumptions were accepted.83 
Despite these uncertainties, prejudgment interest was awarded.84 
The use of the phrase “mathematical accuracy” is truly unfortunate. By their 
nature, damages are calculated by constructing a hypothetical violation-free, but-
for, scenario that necessarily requires a damage expert to make assumptions. The 
courts, however, provide no guidance with regard to which “reasonably certain” 
assumptions can be judged to be “mathematically accurate” and which fail to meet 
this standard. For example, it cannot be the case that prejudgment interest is 
appropriate only where an expert’s assumptions are uncontested.85 However, in 
Cornia v. Wilcox,86 the Utah Supreme Court denied prejudgment interest to a 
plaintiff in a breach of contract and common law agistment case because the jury 
heard conflicting testimony on every important aspect of the damages 
calculation.87 
In Cornia, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the defendant for the 
total care of approximately 500 head of cattle for one year.88 At the end of the 
year, several hundred cattle were missing, and those found were extremely 
unhealthy.89 The plaintiffs’ expert assumed, for purposes of calculating damages, 
that every lost mature cow was pregnant despite clear evidence that only half of the 
returned mature cattle were pregnant.90 Additionally, the jury heard conflicting 
testimony on the expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market 
prices for both mature cattle and calves.91 Because these disputed factors were the 
most significant ones for determining damages, the court affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of prejudgment interest: 
 
Plaintiffs’ expert did estimate the value of the missing cows in his 
damage calculation. However, “[w]hile the expert’s estimates were a 
reliable enough basis for awarding damages, the assumptions used to 
                                                 
82 Id. at 317. 
83 Id. at 316–17 (describing plaintiff’s methodology for calculating damages, includ-
ing using the highest stock value as the basis for damages). 
84 Id. at 317. 
85 The United States District Court’s opinion in ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chiang, 
No. 2:07-CV-37-TC, 2009 WL 1108800, at *2–3 (D. Utah Apr. 20, 2009), probably erred 
in the direction of not awarding interest. 
86 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). 
87 Id. at 1387. 
88 Id. at 1382. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1386. 
91 Id. at 1387. 
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arrive at those estimates are by no means the only way to arrive at [the] 
damages.” Without any clear factual information, plaintiffs’ damages 
could not be measured by “facts and figures” or “calculated with 
mathematical accuracy.”92 
 
This same general analysis would apply to nearly every single contested claim 
brought in Utah—most cases have competing experts or use experts who make 
different assumptions and offer opinions based on those assumptions. Taking the 
court’s basis to its logical conclusion would lead to a wholesale prohibition of 
prejudgment interest. Indeed, juries must almost always choose between 
conflicting assumptions offered by experts on opposing sides regarding damages. 
Moreover, were this the general rule, the sensible litigation strategy is clear: 
dispute every assumption, thereby eliminating the possibility of an award of 
prejudgment interest. It cannot possibly be a coherent rule that prejudgment 
interest is only permitted when an expert’s damage calculation and assumptions 
are unchallenged. Yet this appears to be what is required under the 
“mathematically accurate” rule. 
In Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc.,93 the Tenth Circuit, employing 
Utah law, denied prejudgment interest because the plaintiff offered multiple 
damage calculations throughout the course of the litigation.94 Specifically, the 
plaintiff made several adjustments to its damage calculation, including one 
estimate of total damages in its complaint, a different estimate offered in an 
interrogatory, a third number offered in an affidavit, and still a fourth number 
offered at trial.95 The plaintiff argued that the revised damage figure resulted from 
new information that became available through discovery and because there was a 
slight miscalculation in an earlier estimate of costs. The court held that the 
changing damage figure made it clear that damages could not be calculable within 
a mathematical certainty.96 This evolving damage figure, combined with the lack 
of proof offered by the plaintiff of its claim of a 35% gross profit margin used to 
calculate damages, resulted in the court rejecting a claim for prejudgment 
interest.97 The court seemed to suggest that putting forth different damage 
estimates throughout the entire litigation process could result in a denial of 
prejudgment interest.98 
This draconian rule ignores the realities of litigation and the discovery 
process, and even contradicts the broad initial disclosure requirement found in 
                                                 
92 Id. (alterations in original). 
93 428 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2005). 
94 Id. at 1283; see AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 576 F.3d 1050, 1056–57 
(10th Cir. 2009). 
95 Pro Axess, 428 F.3d at 1283. 
96 Id. at 1284. 
97 Id. at 1283–84. 
98 Id. 
86 UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW [2013 
Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99 At the outset of litigation, a 
plaintiff can rarely present a precise calculation absent information obtained during 
discovery. Thus, parties are placed on the horns of a dilemma—follow Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (which requires disclosure of a computation of each 
category of damages) and risk losing prejudgment interest by miscalculating 
damages at the preliminary stages of litigation, or wait until all discovery is 
concluded before submitting a “mathematically certain” damage calculation and 
risk running afoul of the broad initial disclosure requirements.100 This rule 
punishes parties who attempt to comply with Rule 26(a), which partly explains 
why most plaintiffs refuse to provide any information on damages as part of initial 
disclosures and instead report that damages will be the subject of future discovery. 
In 2009, the Utah Supreme Court attempted to clarify the prejudgment interest 
standard with hopes of bringing it closer to how it was originally articulated in 
Fell. In Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC,101 the Utah Supreme 
Court held that “the [prejudgment interest] standard focuses on the measurability 
and calculability of the damages.”102 The court further held that prejudgment 
interest is appropriately awarded where damage figures are subject to calculation, 
even if the method of calculating those damages is uncertain.103 The defendants 
argued three reasons why the plaintiff should not receive prejudgment interest: (1) 
the plaintiff could not consistently determine its own damages (i.e., Pro Axess), (2) 
the trial court had to use its “best judgment” in determining damages (i.e., Cornia), 
and (3) the trial court had to determine the “reasonableness” of some of the aspects 
of damages that were alleged (i.e., Bjork).104 In addressing the defendant’s 
arguments, the court returned to a more accurate description of the Fell standard by 
explaining that damages that cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy are 
left to “the broad discretion of the trier of fact,” based on a “mere description of 
the wrongs done or injuries inflicted.”105 First, the court distinguished Pro Axess, 
holding that the evolving damages in Pro Axess could not be calculated with any 
degree of mathematical certainty, unlike the amended damages in Encon, which 
did not infringe on the court’s ability to subject the figures to mathematical 
calculation.106 The court held that both parties agreed in Encon that the profit rate 
                                                 
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (requiring parties to submit, as part of its initial disclosures, a 
“computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party”). 
100 A party could, in theory, keep the original estimate provided as part of the initial 
disclosures, but it is very uncommon for damages to be known with any degree of 
confidence or certainty before any discovery has taken place. 
101 210 P.3d 263 (Utah 2009). 
102 Id. at 272. 
103 Id. at 273. 
104 Id. at 272. 
105 Id. at 272–73. 
106 Id. at 273–74. The court held that a voluntary reduction in the claimed damages 
done to conform to the evidence is not enough to preclude an award of prejudgment 
interest, even if the adjustment is done during the course of trial. Id. at 273. 
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on the fixed-price contract at issue was 10% and that 41.9% of the project had been 
completed, unlike in Pro Axess, where one side used an unsupported 35% profit 
rate. Thus, in Encon the trial court could simply multiply the fixed-rate contract 
price and the percentage of the project that had been completed, using the agreed 
upon profit rate.107  
Second, the court distinguished Cornia, holding that the existence of 
competing experts on the issue of damages does not automatically preclude 
prejudgment interest. The court noted that in Encon, the parties agreed that it was a 
fixed price contract, that a 10% profit rate was acceptable under the circumstances, 
and that 41.9% of the project had been completed.108 Thus, although the exact 
figures were in dispute, the calculation itself was still subject to mathematical 
calculation and that merely “[e]xercising . . . discretion to determine which 
expert’s valuation was more accurate does not present the same concern . . . raised 
in Cornia.”109  
Third, the court held that a dispute between experts on what costs to include 
in a valuation does not, by itself, render a damage calculation incapable of being 
measurable with facts and figures.110 After disposing of each of the defendant’s 
arguments against prejudgment interest, the court also acknowledged that a party’s 
damage figures do not need to be static from the date the claim is filed through 
final judgment to be entitled to prejudgment interest.111 
Following the court’s recent decision on prejudgment interest, we can 
summarize the current Utah standards as follows: 
 
1. Prejudgment interest is appropriate when damages are both 
measurable and calculable.112 
 
2. The existence of competing experts, by itself, is not enough to 
preclude an award of prejudgment interest.113 
 
3. Damages that are to be determined by the broad discretion of the 
trier of fact are not eligible for prejudgment interest (e.g., damages 
for defamation, wrongful death, false imprisonment).114 
 
4. A minor adjustment in a damage calculation over the course of 
litigation, does not, by itself, preclude an award of prejudgment 
interest, as long as the adjustment does not “infringe the court’s 
                                                 
107 Id. at 274 n.31. 
108 Id. at 274–75 & n.31. 
109 Id. at 275. 
110 Id. at 274. 
111 Id. at 275. 
112 Id. at 272. 
113 Id. at 274–75. 
114 Id. at 272–73 & n. 23. 
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ability to subject those damage figures to mathematical 
calculation.”115 
 
5. Damage figures do not need to be static over time to be eligible for 
prejudgment interest, but the figures themselves must be subject to 
mathematical calculation and not based on a mere description of the 
wrongs done or injuries inflicted.116 
 
Despite the Utah Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the law on prejudgment 
interest, what remains is still a confusing and inconsistent standard. While these 
broad guidelines are superior to the rigid, pre-Encon requirements of a 
“mathematical certainty” standard, they are economically unsound under many 
circumstances discussed in more detail below. Even so, it is not clear whether the 
mathematical certainty standard remains intact given the court’s pronouncement in 
Encon that each of the iterations offered by the court—including the requirement 
of mathematical certainty—is “correct,” despite moving to a “measurability” and 
“calculability” standard.117 
 
B.  The Statutory Prejudgment Interest Rate in Utah 
 
Once it has been determined that a party is eligible for prejudgment interest, 
the rate itself is typically set by statute. In Utah, there are two statutes addressing 
the appropriate rate. Section 15-1-1 of the Utah Code sets the prejudgment interest 
rate for contracts, in the absence of a negotiated rate in the contract, at a simple 
(that is, not compounded) rate of 10% per annum.118 Until 2009, this section and 
the established rate also applied to personal injury damages eligible for 
prejudgment interest.119 However, in 2009, the Utah Legislature amended this 
section and changed the prejudgment interest rate in personal injury cases to a 
simple rate of 7.5% per annum.120 The legislative history of the 2009 amendment 
indicates a likely compromise was reached by setting the rate at 7.5%. An earlier 
draft of the bill included the following language that did not survive in the final 
bill: 
 
In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injury, the 
defendant shall accurately calculate any prejudgment interest and 
establish the accuracy of the calculation. If the defendant does not, any 
prejudgment interest on special damages shall be calculated at the legal 
                                                 
115 Id. at 274. 
116 Id. at 272, 275. 
117 Id. at 272. 
118 UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1(2) (West 2009). 
119 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-824 (West 2008). 
120 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-824 (West 2011 & Supp.). 
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rate as defined in Section 15-1-1 from the date of occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action to the date judgment is entered.121 
 
The next version of the bill replaced the reference to Section 15-1-1 with a fixed 
8% prejudgment interest rate.122 The final bill dropped the prejudgment interest 
rate to 7.5% per annum simple interest without debate or discussion.123 As a result, 
Utah now has different prejudgment interest rates for contract and personal injury 
causes of action.124 Accordingly, if a court determines that a party is eligible for 
prejudgment interest (and the contract between the parties does not otherwise 
indicate such a rate), the court simply selects the applicable statutory rate and 
applies it to the damage award determined by the trier of fact. 
In summary, Utah law regarding when a party is eligible for prejudgment 
interest is confusing and internally inconsistent, despite recent attempts by the 
Utah Supreme Court to clarify the standard. Moreover, even if a party is 
determined to be eligible for prejudgment interest, the rate that is applied, which is 
set by statute, is different for different causes of action.  In the final section below, 
we evaluate Utah law on prejudgment interest through the lens of economics.  
 
IV.  AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF UTAH LAW ON PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 
In many respects, the current Utah legal standard conflicts with the economic 
principles set forth in Section I. In other respects, Utah law simply lacks logical 
coherence. Laws create incentives, either purposefully or inadvertently. Since the 
sole purpose of prejudgment interest is compensation for delay,125 the incentives 
created by a prejudgment interest rule should be neutral. However, Utah’s 
prejudgment interest standard and statutory rate sometimes favor plaintiffs and 
sometimes favor defendants, but almost always encourage at least one party to 
attempt to game the system so as to change the economic value of a damage award 
merely by delaying the date of final judgment. In this section we explore these 
conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies in greater detail. 
 
A.  Utah Law on Prejudgment Interest Violates Simple Economic Principles 
 
As described above, parties are only eligible for prejudgment interest if the 
damage calculation to which it is connected is “complete,” or “fixed as of a 
particular time,” or “measurable by facts and figures.”126 Often what courts mean 
                                                 
121 H.B. 192, 2009 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 23, 2009) (H. Comm. Amend. 1). 
122 H.B. 192, 2009 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 23, 2009) (H. Comm. Amend. 2). 
123 H.B. 192, 2009 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 23, 2009) (H. Comm. Amend. 3). 
124 § 78B-5-824 itself prohibits prejudgment interest on future wages, which assumes 
that discounting is to the trial date. This language, unfortunately, creates ambiguity in the 
statute. 
125 See Knoll, supra note 54, at 294. 
126 Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 272 (Utah 2009). 
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by these alternative formulations is that damages that are determined by a jury 
without significant expert guidance are not eligible for prejudgment interest.127 The 
holding in the case of Russo v. Ballard Medical Products is typical: “the jury likely 
considered [plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment in determining the damages, precluding 
an award of prejudgment interest.”128 According to Utah law, if the damage award 
is left to the broad discretion of the trier of fact, the injured party will not receive 
prejudgment interest.129 As discussed in detail below, the rationale is the 
unsupported supposition that juries incorporate prejudgment interest whenever 
they determine damages without guidance from experts.130 In addition to its other 
problems, this approach to restraining jury overreaching violates the “dollar is a 
dollar” principle because it requires that prejudgment interest be allocated based on 
the type of claim pled, as well as the ability of an expert to quantify the injury. For 
example, because damages related to loss of employment are relatively easy to 
calculate, plaintiffs will typically receive prejudgment interest in such cases. In 
contrast, a self-employed entrepreneur subjected to defamation, with a similar loss 
of future income, will not receive prejudgment interest because the loss of 
reputation is more difficult to quantify by an expert and more of the determination 
is left to the jury. The losses may be exactly the same, yet Utah law essentially 
penalizes the defamation victim, but not the negligence or wrongful termination 
victim. 
In this regard, Utah law takes an extreme position in its attempt to control 
perceived jury abuse. Even if only a portion of an award is subjected to jury 
determination under Utah law, the entire award is ineligible for prejudgment 
interest. For example, in Russo, the court denied an award of prejudgment interest 
because the trier of fact likely included the equitable claim in its calculation of 
damages: 
 
Here, the $20 million award was based on the perceived harm of 
Ballard’s misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of the 
[Confidential Disclosure Agreement]. . . . Further, the jury likely 
considered Ballard’s unjust enrichment in determining the damages, 
precluding an award of prejudgment interest. Accordingly, Mr. Russo’s 
jury verdict does not qualify for prejudgment interest under Utah law.131 
 
The court recognized that damages for misappropriation of trade secrets can 
include the actual loss caused by the misappropriation, which may have been 
                                                 
127 See Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., No. 2:05-CV-59, 2007 WL 752164, at *1 (D. 
Utah Mar. 7, 2007) (quoting Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1068–69 (Utah 
2003)). 
128 Id. at *2. 
129 See supra text accompanying note 112. 
130 See Russo, 2007 WL 752164, at *2. 
131 Id. 
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proven by the plaintiff in that case.132 But under the court’s ruling, the actual and 
measurable damages that the plaintiff may have incurred as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct were not eligible for prejudgment interest because there was 
also an element of unjust enrichment that the jury may have also considered.133 
Moreover, the rationale that when juries determine damages they include 
prejudgment interest and, therefore, an explicit award of prejudgment interest 
would result in overcompensation is most likely litigator folklore.134 Instead of 
assuming, without any real evidence, that juries have wrapped prejudgment interest 
into awarded damages, a far better way to handle this concern is to provide the jury 
with a specific jury instruction on the issue of prejudgment interest and force the 
jury to execute a special jury form that contains a separate entry for prejudgment 
interest.135 
An even more egregious violation of the “dollar is a dollar” principle is that 
Utah law treats two equivalent damage methodologies, for the same injury, 
differently for the purposes of the application of prejudgment interest. It is well 
known that the methodologies for calculating the fair market value of a lost asset 
and the discounted lost profits from a lost asset are mathematically equivalent.136 
Yet one of these measures will receive prejudgment interest under Utah law while 
the other will not. For example, in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.,137 the Utah 
Supreme Court permitted prejudgment interest on damages calculated using a fair 
market value calculation of real property.138 The court acknowledged that two Utah 
Court of Appeals opinions reached the opposite conclusion, determining that fair 
market value calculations are “inherently uncertain.”139 In overruling these 
decisions, the court simply noted that denying prejudgment interest on a fair 
market value calculation of real property is inherently inconsistent with Fell.140 
Similarly, in Kraatz v. Heritage Imports,141 the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed an 
award of prejudgment interest on a fair market value calculation of an automobile 
dealership calculated using the book value of the dealership’s assets and future 
                                                 
132 Id. at *2 & n.4. 
133 Id. at *2. 
134 See Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instructions 
on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743, 748–49 (2000) (discussing how 
there is almost no empirical data on whether jurors correctly interpret, much less even 
understand, jury instructions on damages). 
135 Id. at 748 (discussing how jurors in criminal cases seem to comprehend specific 
jury instructions with greater precision than vague and confusing instructions regarding 
damages). 
136 See PRATT, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
137 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003). 
138 Id. at 1069–70. 
139 Id. at 1070 n.7. 
140 Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907). 
141 71 P.3d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
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earnings potential.142 The court held that “[t]his loss is not of the type considered 
to be unfixed and unmeasurable, such as the loss involved in pain and suffering or 
wrongful death.”143 
In contrast, in ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang,144 a Utah District 
Court declined to award prejudgment interest for an estimate of lost profits using a 
discounted cash flow methodology.145 In that case, the court held that the expert’s 
assumptions were challenged by the opposing party’s expert, thus prejudgment 
interest was not appropriate despite those assumptions being reliable enough to 
provide a basis for awarding damages.146 
This distinction makes no sense. Conceptually, the fair market value of, for 
example, real property can be arrived at by estimating the value of the future profit 
stream the property could generate in its highest and best use.147 Similarly, a lost 
profits analysis for a lost parcel of land would be performed by discounting the 
future profits from the property. Both measures are an estimate of how much a 
buyer would be willing to pay for the property today.148 Why Utah law treats two 
methods differently with regard to the prejudgment interest is a mystery. 
 
B.  Utah’s Statutory Prejudgment Interest Rates  
Are Inconsistent with Applicable Economic Principles 
 
The Utah Legislature has established different prejudgment interest rates for 
contract causes of action (in the absence of an agreed-upon rate) and personal 
injury claims.149 Both of these rates ignore changes in macroeconomic interest 
rates, are simple and not compounded rates, and are, of course, different for 
different claims (thereby implying that a dollar in contract damages is not the same 
as a dollar in tort damages). 
The distinction between the rates of interest applied to different causes of 
action is a glaring example of legislatively created inconsistency. The legislative 
history provides no reasoning of either provision for the choice of an interest rate 
or its limited application to a specific cause of action. 
Utah statutes do make clear that prejudgment interest awarded in Utah is to be 
calculated using simple interest rather than compounding.150 Presumably, this rule 
was developed for simplicity and ease of calculation. Yet anyone with access to a 
computer or an interest table can calculate compound interest. When the law goes 
                                                 
142 Id. at 204–05. 
143 Id. at 204. 
144 No. 2:07-CV-37, 2009 WL 1108800 (D. Utah Apr. 20, 2009). 
145 Id. at *3. 
146 Id. at *2–3. 
147 SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A 
BUSINESS 268–70 (3d ed. 1996). 
148 See id. 
149 See supra Part III.B. 
150 See supra Part III.B. 
NO. 1] ECONOMICS AND LAW OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 93 
 
 
to such extraordinary lengths to establish procedural fairness and to ensure legal 
outcomes are based on reliable evidence, why intentionally mandate that 
economically incorrect calculations be introduced which harm plaintiffs in order to 
avoid use of a calculator or computer? 
Utah law further fixes a prejudgment interest rate for all time (or, more 
accurately, determines two different prejudgment interest rates for all time).151 
Setting a fixed prejudgment interest rate by statute ignores market realities—
markets determine the amount of money the plaintiff would have been able to earn 
had there been no injury, and it’s unclear why the Utah Legislature believes that it 
should supplant the market in this case. Since the statutory rates are, except in 
unusual (inflationary) circumstances, above typical market rates, it would appear 
that the Legislature wanted to provide more compensation for delay than would the 
use of market-determined prejudgment interest rates. So, in contrast with excluding 
compounding (which hurts plaintiffs), by setting a fixed-rate independent of 
market conditions, the Utah Legislature has intervened in a way that generally 
overcompensates plaintiffs. 
Setting a statutory rate above what is likely to be an applicable market rate 
does, however, provide incentives for plaintiffs to induce delay and for defendants 
to move things along.152 On balance, it is unclear which incentive dominates and, 
hence, it is unclear whether the Legislature’s efforts have speeded up or slowed 
down the pace of litigation. We can find no legislative history that speaks to this 
issue. In any event, because the incentives go in opposite directions, it is unclear 
what impact the blunt statutory rate may have on the speed of litigation. 
 
C.  “Mathematically Certain” Is an Unworkable Standard 
 
Although the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the “mathematically 
certain” standard for prejudgment interest, it remains problematic. A requirement 
that damages be mathematically certain is an unattainable standard. Damage 
experts measure monetary quantities in a hypothetical world in which the violation 
of the law did not occur. Simply by the nature of the processes leading to estimates 
of damages, no certainty, let alone mathematical certainty, could possibly apply to 
a damage calculation. Indeed, there is already a standard in place that estimates of 
damages must meet the established “reasonable certainty” standard under Utah 
law. To be admissible, any damage analysis must meet the requirements of Utah’s 
Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that it must employ approaches that: “(1) are 
                                                 
151 See supra Part III.B. 
152 This is because, when the statutory prejudgment interest rate exceeds the rate that 
could be earned in the market, the better investment is litigation. Put differently, a plaintiff 
is incentivized to extend the litigation to continue earning a rate in excess of what could be 
earned in the market. 
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reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably 
applied to the facts [of the case].”153 
Under this established standard, damage analyses are already subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny before being presented to a jury. However, given that a jury is 
allowed to consider damages estimates based on “reasonable certainty” and Rule 
of Evidence 702, it makes no sense to impose a higher standard (in this case an 
unreachable one) before prejudgment interest on these damages is allowed. Put 
differently, the “mathematical certainty” requirement imposes an additional and 
unnecessary requirement on expert calculations—a requirement that may be nearly 
impossible to adhere to if there are competing experts. 
The “mathematically certain” standard is also used to bar prejudgment interest 
for estimates of prospective damages. By their nature, prospective damages are 
hypothetical, but it is unclear why this prevents a party from being fully 
compensated for delay. In Encon, the Utah Supreme Court noted with approval 
several earlier cases in which prejudgment interest was denied for prospective 
damages, even when they were calculated according to accepted standards.154 
However, the rationale for such a rule distinguishing between “prospective” and, 
for example, “once prospective, but now historical” damages is unclear. The court 
notes without explanation that future lost profits are “unrealized.” But historical 
damages, and even immediate damages in many cases, are also “unrealized” in the 
sense that they are determined, in part, by a hypothetical but-for world. The court 
quotes a Utah Court of Appeals decision in Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden 
v. St. Benedict’s Hospital155 with approval that the presence of “lost future profits 
injects an air of uncertainty and speculation into the calculation of damages.”156 
However, prospective damages are not necessarily more speculative than historical 
damages, and both historical and prospective damage calculations must meet the 
admissibility standard under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence before the 
issue of prejudgment interest arises in any event. In sum, there is no principled 
reason to distinguish one component of damages from another with regard to 
prejudgment interest as long as the court allows for the component to enter into the 
actual awardable damages.157 
                                                 
153 UTAH R. EVID. 702. 
154 Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 272–75 (Utah 
2009). The Utah Supreme Court is inconsistent on this point. In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., the court held that “fair market valuations of real property are within the category of 
damages upon which prejudgment interest may properly be awarded.” 82 P.3d 1064, 1069 
(Utah 2003). Indeed, the calculation of fair market value involves discounting future 
values, or estimating this amount using the market method. 
155 884 P.2d 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
156 Encon, 210 P.3d at 274 n.30 (quoting Anesthesiologists Assoc. of Ogden v. St. 
Benedict’s Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
157 Courts applying Utah law deny prejudgment interest altogether when damages are 
calculated as unjust enrichment. See Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., No. 2:05-CV-59, 2007 
WL 752164 (D. Utah Mar. 7, 2007). There is no valid reason for such a prohibition. 
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D.  Discounting to the Date of Trial or Final Judgment  
Awards Prejudgment Interest at a Rate Unrelated to Delay 
 
As demonstrated earlier, if a court permits the plaintiff to discount prospective 
damages to the date of trial rather than the date of injury, the court is effectively 
awarding prejudgment interest equal to the discount rate, thereby sidestepping 
legal and statutory prejudgment interest requirements.158 Allowing the plaintiff to 
discount prospective harms to the date of trial also creates inconsistencies within 
the law as well as inconsistencies with basic economic principles. 
A simple example illustrates the several inconsistencies that arise when a 
court allows the plaintiff to discount prospective harm to the date of trial (Tj) rather 
than the date of injury (T0). Suppose that the immediate harm (H0) is $100,000 and 
the prospective harm is the possible loss of $1 million ten years from the date of 
injury. Suppose further that, due to delay, the trial is scheduled to occur three years 
after the date of injury. Suppose that the prejudgment interest rate is 8% (set, for 
example, by statute), compounding is permitted and the agreed-upon discount rate 
for prospective harms is 20% (as determined by evidence). Suppose, finally, that at 
the last minute the trial is postponed one year, so that it now occurs four years after 
the date of injury. 
Had the trial occurred after three years, the plaintiff would have been awarded 
$405,051 [$100,000 x (1.08)3 + $1,000,000 / (1.2)7]. Exactly the same immediate 
harm ($100,000) and prospective harm ($1 million, 10 years from the date of 
injury) would yield damages of $473,909 following the one-year additional delay 
if a court allows for discounting to the date of trial and final judgment (assumed to 
be the same in this example). The plaintiff is awarded, essentially, prejudgment 
interest of about $68,000 for the one year delay, which is an “effective” 
prejudgment interest rate of 17%. There is an obvious inconsistency between the 
prejudgment interest rate the court believes it is applying (8%) and the rate of 
prejudgment interest the plaintiff actually receives for this one-year delay (17%). 
Clearly, the effective prejudgment interest rate can also exceed the statutory 
prejudgment interest rate. That is, the actual interest awarded in determining 
damages can (depending upon the difference between r and R) be greater than the 
legislature-mandated prejudgment interest rate. Hence, if the legislature believes 
that it should set the prejudgment interest rate—which the Utah Legislature has 
clearly done in certain cases—its efforts will be subverted whenever there are 
prospective as well as immediate harms included in damages, and courts allow 
plaintiffs to discount prospective harms to the date of final judgment. 
It is also clear that the effective prejudgment interest rate when discounting is 
to the trial date will exceed the risk-free rate and, in almost all cases, the 
defendant’s borrowing rate. This means that if a court, in the absence of specific 
statute, is persuaded by the argument that the prejudgment interest rate should be 
either the risk-free rate or the defendant’s borrowing rate, but then allows the 
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plaintiff to discount prospective harms to the date of final judgment, it is allowing 
the plaintiff to subvert the court’s determination of the appropriate prejudgment 
interest rate. 
Discounting to the date of final judgment has the further effect of awarding 
two different prejudgment interest rates, one explicit and one implicit, and, it 
follows, violates the simple economic principle that “a dollar is a dollar.” 
Specifically, some dollars (those tied to prospective harms) are worth more than 
other dollars (those tied to immediate harms). This is a particularly curious 
outcome given that courts generally view prospective damages as “less certain” 
than immediate or other “historical” damages. 
Discounting to the date of trial also means that a plaintiff can receive implicit 
prejudgment interest when the law may not have allowed for explicit prejudgment 
interest. For example, suppose that the $100,000 in immediate damages meets a 
“mathematical accuracy” (or similar) test, but the $1 million in prospective 
damages does not. Then when applying this or an analogous test, if the $1 million 
were discounted to the date of injury, there would be no compensation for delay 
for the (present) value of that component of damages, while there would be 
compensation for delay for the $100,000 component. The plaintiff could get 
compensation for delay for the (present) value of the $1 million, however, by 
persuading the court that she should be able to discount the $1 million to the date 
of trial and, oddly, the effective prejudgment interest on the $1 million would be 
larger than the actual prejudgment interest allowed on the $100,000. In short, with 
regard to the various components of damages, something comes in the back door 
which the court thought it was preventing from entering the front door. 
This tangle of inconsistencies is avoided when prospective damages are 
discounted to the date of injury, and then treated, on the “dollar is a dollar” 
principle, in the same way as immediate and historic damages with regard to 
prejudgment interest. The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, nor 
has the Tenth Circuit. In Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons,159 however, the 
Eleventh Circuit states exactly this proposition: 
 
Ideally, the stream of lost future income would begin with the date of 
Deakle’s injuries, with no distinction being made between lost past 
wages and lost future wages. The next step would be to total the 
discounted installments and then add “interest” to the entire sum for the 
period between the date of injury and the date of trial.160 
 
By adopting this reasoned approach, all of the above-described problems 
concerning discounting to the date of judgment would be eliminated. Specifically, 
the approach advocated by the Eleventh Circuit is consistent with fundamental 
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economic precepts, and the stated goal of damages, which is to put the injured 
party in the same position they would have been in had the injury not occurred. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Legal rules are often designed to provide different incentives to plaintiffs and 
defendants. With regard to prejudgment interest, however, it is not clear why there 
should be a bias in either direction. Absent a convincing argument for leaning 
toward one party or the other, we conclude that as a normative matter, the ideal 
rule for prejudgment interest should be neutral with regard to delay: plaintiffs are 
compensated fully for delay and defendants pay the market rate for the benefits 
they implicitly derive from holding money that belongs to the plaintiff. This simple 
“neutrality rule” implies, of course, that all claims should be treated equally with 
regard to applying prejudgment interest; that there should not be a legislatively-set 
prejudgment rate or legislative mandating of simple, rather than compound, 
interest; and that prospective damages should be discounted to the date of injury 
and not the date of trial. 
We conclude this Article with another admonition from the Eleventh Circuit: 
“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before 
and after trial so that neither party can benefit by delaying the final judgment.”161 
Utah could substantially reduce the problems and inconsistencies that derive 
from the current legal treatment of prejudgment interest if it were to adopt a simple 
principle: other than adding prejudgment interest, if a change in the trial date 
increases or decreases estimated damages, the methodology being used embeds an 
inconsistency concerning the treatment of time. 
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